Faulkner\u27s Subject: A Cosmos No One Owns by Weinstein, Philip M.
Swarthmore College 
Works 
English Literature Faculty Works English Literature 
1992 
Faulkner's Subject: A Cosmos No One Owns 
Philip M. Weinstein 
Swarthmore College, pweinst1@swarthmore.edu 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in English Literature 
Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact 
myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-english-lit 
 Part of the English Language and Literature Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Philip M. Weinstein. (1992). "Faulkner's Subject: A Cosmos No One Owns". Faulkner's Subject: A Cosmos 
No One Owns. 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-english-lit/82 
Introduction
A cosmos of one’s own: Faulkner conceived as early as the 1920s that his 
unfolding fictions would come together in the guise of a coherent world. 
As “sole owner and proprietor,” his would be the gaze that brings into 
being such a world: Be Yoknapatawpha! is the vocative engendering the 
creation. Gary Stonum and Eric Sundquist, among others, have exam­
ined the pitfalls and betrayals attendant upon this generative masculine 
ideal; and Faulkner’s commentators more broadly have remarked on the 
unevenness of the career, the inconsistencies within its unfolding, and the 
protracted sadness of its closing years.*
Like Balzac, but also like Sutpen, Faulkner would become a demigod, 
drawing upon given historical materials but designing them in such a 
way as to reveal no traces but his own - the writer’s own subjective 
lineaments writ large in the lives and landscapes of his shaping. Such a 
masculine urge toward self-ratification appears everywhere in the novels 
themselves, aggressively in the dynastic ambitions of a Sartoris or Mc- 
Caslin or Flem Snopes, but just as often defensively as the need for 
sanctuary (a stay against “the maelstrom of unbearable reality” [AA 186]), or 
as the intensifying narrative desire for completion: to say it all, now, in 
one inclusive, ten-thousand-word sentence that would close the circle of 
utterance. Say it now, while coherence - even if only an illusion of 
memory and desire, an artifact of discourses approaching obsolescence - 
is still intact, the abrasions of “Chinese and African and Aryan and Jew” 
(GDM 364) still at bay. “My last book will be the Doomsday Book, the
> “Apocrypha” (Faulkner’s chosen word for the furthest reaches of his work; from the 
actual “into the apocryphal” [Stein 82]) has been read by Joseph Urgo as signaling, 
however unintentionally, the sense not of an orderly cosmos but of a transgressive space 
where authority is in crisis. Martin Kreiswirth has recently commented on the di­
achronic/dialogic impulse that generates Yoknapatawpha: “Faulkner is always breaking 
what Derrida calls ‘the law of genre.’ ”
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Golden Book of Yoknapatawpha County. Then I shall break the pencil 
and I’ll have to stop” (Stein 82).
Faulkner’s major novels are the ones in which this desire (imperial 
or beleaguered) for self-ratifying clashes most urgently with the dif­
ferential forces - shaped by politics, race, and gender - that would unseat 
the coherence of the struggling male subject. In theme and form these 
novels enact the invasion of the unknown into the precincts of the 
familiar, and they suggest that such acts of self-constitution produce 
a selfhood not sutured but splintered - a subjectivity irreparably fissured, 
a cosmos no one owns. The goal of my study is to open up the di­
mensions of that invasion and to remap the terrain of a subjectivity 
requiring different terms for its reconstrual.^ I attend therefore to the 
texts written between 1929 and 1942, the ones in which the pressures for 
and against the acknowledgment of human being (in the writer, his char­
acters, and his readers in the act of response) are most agonistically in 
play.^
Put otherwise, Faulkner’s supreme novels are those in which the pro­
ject of subjective coherence is under maximal stress. As I read him, 
Faulkner was hurt into greatness. What Kristeva calls the “semiotic” - 
those gaps and discontinuities in discourse that betoken , the subject’s 
living struggle against the culture’s grids of Symbolic meaning - drives 
the experimental novels and reveals a narratorial subjectivity profoundly 
at odds with its conventional options.'* The self-ratifying he and his white 
male protagonists require collides with and shatters against the alterities 
that make up both his inner and his outer world - alterities that I shall
2 This remapping involves the use of a variety of contemporary discourses for thinking 
about the fissured subject; Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian reflection on the subject 
as constituted by ideology (a paradigm revised and further developed in Macherey, 
Eagleton, and Jameson), Derridean deconstruction, Foucauldian commentary on the 
subject as modeled by disciplinary practices, feminist critiques of the universalized male 
model of subjectivity (articulated by Kristeva and Irigaray, expounded by Gallop, Rose, 
and Moi), Bakhtin’s location of the subject as a site of dialogic encounter, Bourdieu’s 
reading of the subject as one who activates the culture’s “habitus,” and finally Smith’s 
revisionary critique of the current theoretical dismissal of the subject as an inescapably 
mystified entity. I apologize for this slew of names at the outset, but insofar as they are 
going genuinely to be used in the following chapters, it seems wise to introduce them 
here.
3 Wadlington’s Reading Faulknerian Tragedy attends with great suppleness to this dimension 
of the work.
“* Whenever Symbolic or Imaginary appears capitalized in this study, the meaning system 
at work is Lacanian. I elaborate at some length upon Lacan’s terminology in Chapter 3, 
but I might briefly indicate here the range of meanings I intend. Imaginary refers to the 
dimension of experience that operates visually - through irrationally projected and intro- 
jected images in the spatial field - and that begins prior to entry into language. Symbolic 
refers to the dimension of experience that operates within the field of language - the 
learned networks of kinship and culture, of code and law - and that assumes centrality 
after the Oedipal crisis. Both these sense-making registers begin in early childhood, and 
they continue to inflect subjectivity in overlapping and conflicting ways throughout life.
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examine most fully in the form of women and blacks. From the intensity 
of this collision come the precious texts.
My “own” criterion of value (my reason for preferring this handful of 
novels) registers a Modernist sensibility opened to a Postmodernist cri­
tique. Faulkner’s brilliantly unruly early texts pass on to us (into us) the 
visceral assault of culture upon the subject. In their savage refusal to uplift 
- their continuous ironies — these novels creatively expose as unworkable 
the larger culture’s ideological designs. Despite a current critical move to 
rebuke Modernism for the blindnesses preserved within this stance of 
“seeing through everything,” I continue to locate Faulkner’s most memo­
rable achievement within such a stance of rebellious experimentation. 
Arguing for his Modernist texts as both the locus of his value and the 
gauge against which we can read the rest of the career, I seek to identify 
the implicit (and broadly shared) cultural discourses that, by enabling this 
cosmos, keep him from ever mastering it as “his own.” The Postmodern 
dimension of this inquiry resides in my attempt to understand the neces­
sary comphcities — the cultural norms and linguistic resources, the posi­
tioning of the white male subject in relation to women and blacks - that 
permit subjective identity, that allow Faulkner to enter the field of dis­
course and become “Faulkner.”
If these are the texts in which the author most risked his authority, they 
are also the ones in whose name, over time, he has most obtained his 
authority. The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, and 
Go Down, Moses have enjoyed canonical status for some forty years now.^ 
What larger cultural arrangements do they openly contest or implicitly 
endorse, such that we (the literary establishment) have institutionalized 
them, made them into Faulkner’s “signature,” even as, in their hazardous 
activities, they call the coherence of any signature into question? Why, 
especially, do we turn to The Sound and the Fury as not only Faulkner’s 
“heart’s darling” but ours too? I shall address these questions indirectly 
throughout the following chapters and explicitly in the conclusion, but 
my aim is less to puncture than to understand these novels’ claims to 
canonicity. Indeed, The Sound and the Fury has been for me, ever since I 
encountered it in 1960, the supreme American novel of our century. This 
study is inconceivable without that prior affection, yet I could never have 
written it without assenting and responding to cumulative pressures 
(provoked by critical theory) upon such a protected icon of value. The 
sanctuary at stake in this book — the subjectivity under scrutiny — bears 
my name as much as Faulkner’s.
5 1 omit As I Lay Dying from this scrutiny because so much of its representative quality is 
shared with The Sound and the Fury. My larger purpose is not to justify canonical ex­
clusiveness but “repercussively” to interrogate Faulkner’s practice within a limited (but 
not privileged) frame.
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I propose to treat this double interrogation (of Faulkner’s coherent 
subjectivity, of my own) not as embarrassing but as enabling. Assign­
ments of literary value involve simultaneously the writer’s work, the 
productive and the receptive cultures’ aesthetic politics, and the reader’s 
subjective positioning with respect to these economies. None of these 
orientations is simply given, all of them invite inquiry. I shall address the 
four novels identified above as among Faulkner’s finest and as prob­
lematic sites on which the higher culture has registered its imprimatur. 
Further, I shall accord the form of The Sound and the Fury canonical status 
within my own study, for I propose, Faulkner-fashion, to treat these four 
novels as he came at the Compson materials: by approaching them (as a 
group) four different times and with four sets of competing questions. 
Such a dialogic strategy privileges difference itself, allowing each lens to 
produce what it produces as I revisit the same (but never the same) 
terrain. Faulkner is a supremely perspectival novelist - or a “reper- 
cussive” one - and it seems right to frame the theoretical issues that most 
call into question his “signature” within a dialogic form that virtually 
constitutes his “signature.”
Repercussive I call him, and my book is likewise repercussive, al­
ways returning, though the place alters not just under a different set of 
lenses but in accord with the differing times of my visit. This diachronic 
dimension is, indeed, wrought into all writing. We would, like Faulkner, 
say it all in one monstrous sentence,^ yet the fate of writing is that it 
proceeds in time and the mind alters during the time of the proceeding. 
“It is because writing is inaugural,” Derrida writes, “that it is dangerous 
and anguishing. It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can 
keep it from the essential precipitation toward the meaning that it con­
stitutes and that is, primarily, its future. There is thus no insurance 
against the risk of writing” (“Force” 11). This small scandal - the aleato­
ry hallmark of all protracted writing - is what we seek to cover up as we 
revise, and I have sought in this book both to acknowledge the scandal 
and to make it productive. I have revised, but not with the illusion that 
my text can become seamless, its argument synchronically complete. So 
the chapters deliberately retain some of the flavor of their original impe­
tus. I aim for dialogic interactions, not the authority of a magisterial 
synthesis. This is not a cosmos I can own.
I have claimed that the critical issues I explore in this book prob- 
lematize Faulkner’s “signature,” and I mean by this more than the fact 
that his identity as a writer alters in time. It also alters according to the 
discursive options available to (and chosen by) him for pursuing it. No 
writer simply delivers into a neutral language his achieved identity: his 
self-engendered sense of “how it is” in here and out there. Perhaps the
* John Irwin candidly reveals this fantasy in the opening pages oCDoubling and Incest, 9.
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most far-reaching Western intellectual claim of our century is that be­
tween self and world there intervenes discourse, and that discourse in­
flects both self and world. Benjamin Lee Whorf writes:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The 
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do 
not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the 
' contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organized in our minds - and this means largely by the 
linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize into con­
cepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties 
to an agreement to organize it in this way — an agreement that holds 
throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our 
language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but 
its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscrib­
ing to the organization and classification of data to which the agreement 
subscribes. (213)
Implicit and obligatory, the agreement we are party to is most 
efficacious in our ongoing ignorance of it. Like Moliere’s M. Jourdain 
who can hardly believe that it is prose that he speaks, we daily participate 
unawares in the most intricate arrangements the moment we draw upon 
language. Foucault’s epistemological work stems directly from this con­
viction and from a desire to revise - by exposing - its implications. “I 
would like to show with precise examples,” he writes in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, “that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the 
loosening of the embrace ... of words and things, and the emergence of 
a group of rules proper to discursive practices. These rules define not the 
dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the 
ordering of objects” (48—9). The words do not attach to the things; they 
sketch out instead the languag^ game in play, the discursive practice’s 
systemic way of ordering its objects.
The order arrived at, because it is produced in language, can only be 
contestable. The unutterable truth is alone serene; it lives as inarticulable 
doxa. But once it becomes encoded, enters language, it is available for 
dispute. Orthodoxy is no more than the desperate battle to resist hetero­
doxy. As the homely analogy of the orthodontist makes clear, orthodoxy 
seeks to straighten the doxa, and this effort (which is undertaken only 
when things have gone crooked) can be both strenuous and painful. 
Pierre Bourdieu writes: “Orthodoxy, straight, or rather straightened, 
opinion, which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the 
primal state of innocence of doxa, exists only in the objective relationship 
which opposes it to heterodoxy, that is, by reference to the choice - 
haeresis, heresy - made possible by the existence of competing possibles and 
to the explicit critique of the sum total of the alternatives not chosen that 
the established order implies” (169).
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To speak (or write) at all is to enter the Whorfian “agreement” 
wrought into the medium itself, but it is also to enter an inherently 
debatable arena, a world of “competing possibles,” of discursive in­
sistences that are always partial, always warding off unwanted alter­
natives. Faulknerian subjectivity - because, like all subjectivity, it is pro­
duced by entry into the politically charged turbulence of discourse itselF 
- cannot be conceived as a disinterested power solitarily authorizing a 
pristine cosmos. It emerges instead “as a way of being as it were at stake 
in the game from the outset” (Derrida, “Structure” 279). Faulkner be­
comes Faulkner by what he submits to exactly as much as by what he 
' rejects. To use Derrida’s terms again: without accepting the medium’s 
authority there is no signification; without resisting it there is no force.
To be “in the game from the outset” does not mean remaining in it 
always in the same way. One of my chief purposes in this book is to chart 
Faulkner’s changing mode of participation in his culture’s “agreements.” 
Between 1929 and 1942 a virtual revolution in his practice occurs, in 
which a Modernist aesthetic of shock emerges, transforms itself, and 
then yields to a more traditional one of recognition. He moves, formally, 
from the jagged invasions of The Sound and the Fury to the sonorous 
plenitude of Go Down, Moses. Whether the practice be iconoclastic or 
orthodox, it articulates “Faulkner” not as inaugurative native genius but 
as a set of individual performances and a certain way of activating or 
resisting the larger discourses - here gender and racial as well as avant- 
garde and traditional - furnished by his culture. To identify William 
Faulkner is to speak of an overdetermined site of interchanges in which 
come into play the writer’s discrete performances, the discursive options 
(accepted, refused, or transformed) of his productive culture (America in 
the first half of our century), and the interpretive orientation of a reader 
responding in the receptive culture of the same country fifty years later. It 
all sounds not so much hopeless as dizzying.
It has not always seemed this complicated. Brooks, Vickery, 
Howe, and Warren could write with a certain confidence about an author 
whom they had brooded upon, sympathized with, and finally under­
stood. “But the shift to this previously unknown narrator,” Brooks 
claims in his introduction to Light in August (1968), “will seem like a trick 
only to the reader who has failed to sense the total meaning of the work” 
(xxv). I know of no astute Faulknerian in the past fifteen years who is
The word “discourse” should be understood in a concrete and plural sense. Faulkner’s 
career involves a changing relation to a range of discursive practices - the nymphs and 
fauns ofJin-de-sieck late Victorianism, the ferocious stylistic experiments of international 
Modernism, the polysyllabic magniloquence of Southern oratory, the mean humor of 
Southwestern vernacular, among others.
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willing to speak of “the total meaning of the work,” and this not because 
of timidity or laziness but because, in Derrida’s words, “If totalization no 
longer has any meaning, it is . . . because the nature of the field - that is, 
language and a finite language - excludes totalization. This field is in 
effect that of play . . . because instead of being too large, there is some­
thing missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of 
substitutions” (“Structure” 289).
The missing center is of course produced and posited in every reading 
of Faulkner - I too will produce my center(s) in the course of these pages 
- but this center is invented as a function of the argument(s) under way. 
Faulkner centers differently according to who (read: what transpersonal 
hermeneutic) is looking at him. He has been changing mightily in the 
past twenty years (unhke his own heroic dead figures, his Sartorises and 
McCaslins, whose images tend to stay put once they are interred), and I 
have been changing with him. This book is possible because of these 
changes. To discuss them, however briefly, is to see that a writer’s identi­
ty (his, mine) is likewise not given but produced. How else could it alter 
so much over time?
The Faulkner of my first love was a towering invention of the New 
Critics: formally experimental, conservative in his values, detached above 
and by means of his ever-present ironies, passionate yet not partisan, 
aware of everything.® We competed with each other during the 1960s and 
early 1970s to see who could celebrate him best, could point out how 
much further his art penetrated into the nature of things than had yet 
been conceded. The critic who both culminated this genre of commen­
tary and inaugurated the next one is Andre Bleikasten. His full-length 
reading (Splendid 1976) of The Sound and the Fury attended with great 
suppleness to the complexity of Faulkner’s formal achievement, but it 
also began the process of inserting that achievement within a larger intel­
lectual frame of Lacanian, structuralist, and poststructuralist values. Si­
multaneously with Bleikasten came John Irwin’s intervention, in which 
“Faulkner” joins the discourses of Nietzsche and Freud and emerges as a 
latent structure lurking somewhere between his books rather than a set of 
utterances contained within any of them. After Irwin, the opening of the 
floodgates and the deluge.
A mere glance at the influential texts on Faulkner written since the 
early 1980s shows that a writer centers according to the emphases of the
® Brooks and Vickery were probably the foremost shapers of Faulkner’s image in the late 
1950s and 1960s, though Sartre, Aiken, Cowley, Howe, and Warren - who wrote before 
them - have remained distinctive voices for articulating Faulkner’s form and value. By 
1963 Millgate was able to consolidate these New Critical findings and propose a narrative 
in which Faulkner’s work appeared both selectively canonical and comprehensively 
mapped.
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culture doing the evaluating. The Faulkner for our decade is a writer 
about race (Sundquist, Snead), gender (Wittenberg, Gwin), language and 
voice (Matthews, Ross), the dynamics of reading (Wadlington, Morris), 
and ideology (Porter, Moreland). Without apology, this is the Faulkner 
addressed in the following chapters. Bleikasten, Matthews, Ross, and 
Wadlington have especially served for me as brothers in a many-peopled 
enterprise. Learning that subjective identity is a matter of affihations 
rather than essences has allowed me to find my Faulkners by letting my 
Faulkner go. That is why the chapters that follow reengage the same 
books, also why the quarrels among the chapters are overt rather than 
concealed. Intentionally diachronic, striving to avoid the twin excesses of 
randomness and overpatterning, this study pursues a Faulkner whose 
own cultural immersion precludes heroism. But without these remark­
able novels there would have been no study at all.
The “cosmos” Faulkner would own is articulable only within a 
language he cannot wholly own, and it bristles with figures unamenable 
to the lineaments of his own white male subjectivity. The first two chap­
ters probe the writer’s resources for articulating the Other within his 
world - its women and blacks - by examining his relation to his culture’s 
larger discursive practices for saying/mystifying/scapegoating their dif­
ferences. Chapter 1 focuses upon gender, both laterally, in the representa­
tion of women as other in the four novels under scrutiny, and vertically, as 
an attempt to unearth the discursive assumptions that generate a cor­
rosive portrait like Mrs. Compson in The Sound and the Fury. In Chapter 
2, I turn to Faulkner’s rendering of race, and I begin by examining the 
marginalizing (as well as the fantasizing) that emerges in Faulkner’s de­
ployment of blacks upon his largely white canvas. This chapter concludes 
with another vertical exploration, this time into the three different script­
ings of Lucas Beauchamp, from magazine stories to Go Down, Moses to 
Intruder in the Dust. Finally, they prepare the context for approaching (in 
the second half of the study) the problematics of subjectivity at the center 
of Faulkner’s texts; the shaping of the white, male subject whose codes in 
turn command the figuring of both women and blacks.
Chapter 3 considers in two different ways the social construction of 
identity. I begin by exploring the privileged notion of individual identity 
within a Western liberal tradition. Then, through the use of conceptual 
terms provided by Lacan and Althusser, a critique is provided. Subjec­
tivity emerges, in this later model, as simultaneously empowering and 
alienating, the interplay - within a single figure - of Imaginary affilia­
tions and Symbolic insistences. Quentin Compson in The Sound and the 
Fury and a variety of figures in Absalom, Absalom! embody the cultural 
crossfire that is subjectivity within Faulkner’s most experimental novels. 
The chapter concludes with a brief comparison of the processes of be-
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coming Joe Christmas and Ike McCaslin in their respective novels. Con­
tinuing to draw upon Lacan and Althusser, but supplementing them with 
some other contemporary theorists of the “postindividualist subject,” I 
propose a variety of signifying economies for thinking about the produc­
tion of subjectivity. The striking shift in tone and procedure between 
these two novels about training-to-be-male reveals as well the other sub­
jectivity that has decisively altered in the ten years between Light in 
August and Go Down, Moses: Faulkner’s.
Chapter 4 broadens further to identify the ideological field of sur­
veillance and contestation within which the Faulknerian voiced body 
moves and has its being.^ I draw on Foucault and Bakhtin to chart the 
ways in which voice and body are figured according to the larger 
culture’s norms regarding gender, class, and race. Faulkner’s texts resist 
and absorb these assumptions in ways that change decisively between 
1929 and 1942. This chapter probes the increasingly secure ideological 
alignment of Faulkner’s work in terms, first, of his rendering of voice and 
body and, second, of the reader’s transferential “contract” with the texts. 
By 1942, I argue, he had lost the capacity (or perhaps the desire) to 
dramatize through reader disorientation and immersion the traumatic 
entry of the individual subject into the culture’s maturational field: a 
traumatic entry at the core of the great Modernist texts. At the level of the 
writing the hurt had ceased, the subject had sutured.
The entry of the subject into the culture, the entry of the reader into 
the text: throughout my argument 1 maintain that the former is crucially 
figured in the latter. Each of these chapters attends to the experience of 
reading Faulkner, for if the subject’s identity is always in process, then the 
act of reading powerfully activates that process. In reading we con­
firm/ alter/ rethink who we are; the suasions of the text seek to realign the 
traces of our minds. All writing is ideological inasmuch as it strategically 
offers to its reader models of being - models that normalize and margin­
alize according to determinate cultural criteria. I seek, therefore, to ex­
plore these texts at the intersection of representational tactics (the posi­
tioning of race and gender, the selective deployment of interiority) and 
readerly experience (the subject-shaping encounter with the novels them­
selves, the kinds of acknowledgment they propose or refuse).
Finally I want to ask why Faulkner has been so important to us, who
“Ideology” serves as a master term in this study, and it receives more extensive defini­
tion in Chapters 2 through 4. I should say at the outset, however, that I take it to mean 
not false consciousness, but rather a set of beliefs and practices that propose coherent 
subjectivity by securing the individual’s alignment within a repertory of socially propa­
gated roles.
I use the term “suture” in a specifically Lacanian way: “Suture ... is the way in which 
the ‘subject’ at one and the same time separates itself from, or disavows, its construction 
in the field of the Other, and simultaneously erects itself in the garb of coherent ‘sub­
ject’ ” (Smith 75).
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the “we” is in this assertion, and what remains of any notion of coherent 
subjectivity if it can be endlessly reconfigured according to different 
signifying economies. Something still remains, or better: something new 
emerges. For subjectivity is a notion we cannot do without. Not the 
undivided subjectivity of liberal Western thought - the (white, male) 
autonomous self-knowing individual - but rather the subject in process, 
the subject in contestation. Beleaguered, charged with Imaginary desires, 
immersed from infancy within conflicting alignments of the Symbolic 
field, this subject is more likely to be a site of interior disturbance than a 
locus of concerted action. Who better than Faulkner has delineated the 
pathos and value of such a figure? How other than by first probing such 
disturbance can any demystified notion of concerted action - of subjec­
tive agency - once again be liberatingly conceived?
